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Territorial control and the scope
and resilience of cannabis and other
illegal drug crop cultivation
Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy
1 Illegal  drug  crop  cultivation  is  a  highly  geographical  issue  since  it  is,  as  any  other
agricultural activity, a spatial phenomenon with obvious territorial dimensions. As such,
the extent of illegally cultivated areas in a given country is directly linked to the degree
of – or lack of, for that matter – politico-territorial control exerted by the state and its
apparatus. Whether cannabis, coca bushes or opium poppies are concerned, drug crop
cultivation can only be illegally undertaken and carried out on a large commercial scale
in very specific politico-territorial settings. Illegal drug crops are of course cultivated by
individual  farmers  and  farming  communities  for  various  economic  reasons  (lack  of
resources, food insecurity, lack of or limited access to markets, etc.), which have been
described and analysed at length in other publications, but this article focuses on what
makes drug crop cultivation possible in certain countries despite its illegality. 
2 Here the research question is not why farmers illegally cultivate drug crops but why they
can do so in spite of it being illegal, that is, is spite of the laws, policies, and actions of the
concerned states. In this regard, one can say that the territory is a central issue of illegal
drug crop cultivation (Chouvy, 2002) and this paper therefore looks at how the various
degrees and types of politico-territorial control exerted by states and their apparatuses
explain  the  existence  and  the  prolongation  of  illegal  drugs  cultivation  in  certain
countries or territories. 
3 Having worked for decades on illegal opium poppy cultivation in Asia, over the past few
years I have started comparing the contexts and drivers of illegal poppy cultivation with
those of illegal cannabis cultivation, predominantly in Morocco but also in India and in
the United States of America. Comparing illegal cannabis and opium poppy cultivation in
very different countries within and outside of Asia proved valuable not only because
comparative analyses are always beneficial to the understanding of complex phenomena
but also because different illegal drug crops (cannabis, coca, opium poppies) are most
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often  studied  independently  from  one  another.  Therefore,  taking  opium  poppy
cultivation into consideration instead of focusing only on cannabis raises questions that
would otherwise be ignored.
4 I  first  included cannabis cultivation in my research in 2004 when I  briefly compared
(Chouvy, 2004) Afghanistan and Morocco, two Muslim countries where the king is (was in
Afghanistan’s  case)  Amir  al-Mu'minin (Commander of  the Faithful),  where the area of
arable land is similar,  where the cultivated areas in poppy (Afghanistan in 2004) and
cannabis (Morocco in 2003) were equivalent (slightly above 130,000 hectares), and that
later  (2012)  became  known  as  the  world’s  two  foremost  hashish  producers.  As  a
consequence, this article delves on various case studies from Asia, North Africa and North
America (where I have conducted empiric field work) but doesn’t draw on Latin America’s
realities and on coca cultivation/production (no empiric data of my own in that region of
the world), although similar research questions and explanations most likely apply (given
that cannabis, coca, and opium poppies are all cultivated illegally in Latin America). 
5 While armed conflicts cannot, on their own or in all cases, fully explain the emergence of
illegal agricultural drug industries, they are often and rightly mentioned amongst the
foremost factors that lie behind the spread or the sustainability of illegal drug crops,
(McCoy, 1991; Labrousse and Koutouzis, 1996; Chouvy, 2002; Labrousse, 2004). Admittedly,
the outbreak or the prolongation of armed conflicts in countries or regions already home
to illegal drug crop cultivation considerably increases the chances of expanding existing
drug crop areas (Chouvy and Laniel, 2007). Indeed, in Afghanistan and in Burma (now also
known as Myanmar) long and costly armed conflicts have led to the growth of illegal
opium production, notably because the drug economies in each country contributed, to
some extent at least, to the funding of their respective wars (Chouvy, 2009). And this is all
the more so since their wars, in their many forms and dimensions, have been prolonged
to  the  point  of  never  ending,  as  if  opium production  and  war  were  self-sustaining.
Whether in Afghanistan or in Burma, the political fragmentation of both state and non-
state actors involved in the armed conflicts further drove the recourse to thriving drug
economies that ended up motivating at least some of the belligerents (Chouvy, 2002).
6 While there are cases, such as in Morocco, where illegal drug crop cultivation (cannabis)
is a historical heritage of distant wars (the 1920s Rif War), there are of course also cases
where large-scale commercial illegal drug crops have developed outside of war or armed
conflicts,  as  evidenced  by  the  United  States  (indoor  but  also  vast  outdoor  cannabis
cultivation) and India (both outdoor cannabis and opium poppy cultivation) (Chouvy,
2008;  2014;  2015).  The  case  of  the  United  States  is  most  interesting  for  it  actually
invalidates  two  of  the  most  often  cited  causal  explanations  of  illegal  drug  crop
cultivation:  war  and  underdevelopment  (along  with  so-called  failed  states,  overt
corruption, etc.). In truth, the fact that there exists a large but not absolute correlation
between underdevelopment (or poverty or unemployment outside of the so-called Global
South, such as in the United States) and illegal drug crop cultivation, which is comparable
to the correlation between agricultural drug economies and war economies,  does not
seem to be a convincing explanatory factor in itself. Indeed, here correlation is clearly
not causation or else there would be a much larger number of countries (at war and, or,
poverty-stricken) concerned by large-scale illegal drug crop cultivation. 
7 Yet, one can reasonably estimate that most of the world’s cannabis,  coca, and opium
poppy growers (peasant farmers or not: see below about the United States and Morocco)
resort to the drug economy, out of need, that is, to cope with either poverty (most often,
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the resource poor in Afghanistan,  Burma,  Morocco,  etc.,  who have to cope with food
deficits and/or the lack of other viable cash crops) or structural unemployment (out-of-
work individuals or families in the United States,  European countries,  Morocco,  etc.).
There is also, of course, a minority of growers and/or land owners that clearly opts for
drug crops out of economic opportunity, as a form of capitalism (some would say greed)
(Chouvy, 2009). 
8 Also, the large ecological flexibility of the cannabis plant, and in particular the fact that
greenhouse and hydroponic growing can be and are largely resorted to, partly explains,
along with the global development of a cannabis subculture, the phenomenon that is
increasingly taking place in the United States,  Canada and Western Europe.  Yet,  the
opium poppy, unlike the coca bush, can also be grown in some of the most diverse parts
of  the  world,  due  to  its  large  adaptability  to  very  different  climatic  and  edaphic
conditions. As a result, legal and illegal opium poppy cultivation is actually found across
varied climates in Asia, the Americas, Europe, and even Africa (Chouvy, 2002). However,
to the difference of cannabis, whose cultivation and consumption has benefited from a
decades-long and quasi-global subculture, the opium poppy is not illegally cultivated on a
commercial scale in the Western World (only pharmaceutical opiates are produced) or
even in Africa. 
9 In the end, it seems that, in the current context of the global prohibition regime of certain
drugs and the war on drugs that accompanies it, the occurrence of largescale illegal drug
crop cultivation in very diverse countries can be partly explained according to various
types (and levels)  of  politico-territorial  control  deficit,  whether such deficits  proceed
from  corruption,  lack  of  physical  or  financial  means,  conflictual  and  often  violent
relations  between  state  and  non-state  actors  (or  sometimes  between  opposed  state
actors), or tacit agreements akin to realpolitik, again between state actors and non-state
actors (in which case tacit agreements, such as in Morocco, serve to preserve a certain
level of politico-territorial control by the state, and, as a consequence, social and political
stability). While a lack of politico-territorial control is never the cause of illegal drug crop
cultivation, it can clearly ease the onset and development of an illegal drug industry and
one can safely say that such a sufficient level of control deficit is necessary for cannabis,
coca or opium poppy crops to be illegally cultivated on large commercial scales against
the laws and willpower of concerned states. 
 
Illegal drug crop cultivation and types of politico-
territorial control deficit
10 This paper challenges the assumption that illegal drug crop cultivation is necessarily an
indicator of failed development and state weakness (as exemplified by the case of the
United  States).  Still,  weak  politico-territorial control,  failed  development  and  state
weakness/failure  can  clearly  play  crucial  roles  in  enabling  or  even stimulating  the
development of  illegal  drug industries.  In fact, territorialisation processes are always
complex,  fluctuating  and  often  contradictory.  This  is  especially  the  case  in  drug-
producing areas where multiple ongoing territorial dynamics take place, notably by way
of power rivalries over space: in such cases, space control and territorial construction or
competition  can  occur  through drug  production  (when  the  control  of  illegal  drug
production enables or facilitates, if only financially, territorial control: northeast India,
Morocco), for drug production (control of prime agricultural lands or even non-arable
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lands, such as deserts, turned into arable lands: some areas of Afghanistan and Burma),
or, of course, against drug production (when the state or even some non-state actors are
opposed to drug production: United States) (Chouvy, 2002). 
11 In other words, illegal drug economies, and especially illegal drug crop cultivation, can
and actually most often do proceed from absent, weak, or insufficient politico-territorial
control  –  whether  imposed  by,  or  negotiated  with,  non-state  actors  (war  or  armed
conflicts, as well as poverty – individual, familial, regional, etc. – being a frequent catalyst
or condition, without being necessarily a cause). Here, control is meant as the capacity of
the state and its apparatus to exercise restraining influence over its territory and its
population,  that  is,  in  our  specific  case,  its  capacity  to  forbid  largescale  drug  crop
cultivation as implied by state laws and international conventions. When corruption or
realpolitik (tacit agreement between the state and parts of its population, as is the case in
northeast India and in Morocco but clearly not in the United States) allow for illegal drug
cultivation, it obviously and directly affects politico-territorial control (even, of course, if
the  state  has  to  tolerate  drug  crops  in  order  to  politically  control  its  territory  and
population) or, rather, the enforcement by the state of its written laws over its territory
(law-enforcement capacity). In fact, it can be said that the toleration of illegal drug crops
by the state amounts to de facto control of its territory when and where its enables social
and political concord (as, again, in northeast India and Morocco) (Chouvy, 2014a; Chouvy
and Afsahi, 2014).
12 Illegal economies can in turn underpin political settlements that shape processes of state
formation or consolidation.  After all,  the illegal  drug productions of Afghanistan and
Burma, which can be initially understood as coping strategies in – and of – peripheral and
marginalized regions and communities removed from the states’ political centres1, have
eventually and gradually enabled (or provoked) the territorial inclusion of the countries’
margins  by their  respective states,  along,  notably,  processes  of  economic integration
(Shahrani,  1986;  Ispahani,  1989;  Chouvy,  2002).  As  Mahnaz  Ispahani  explains  about
Southwest Asia’s borderlands, “Whereas states cannot come into existence without the
ability to deny access, they cannot be physically consolidated and politically sustained
without the ability to expand access ‒ without the extension of the authority and the
legitimacy of the center to the peripheries” (Ispahani, 1989, p. 7).
13 Indeed,  in Asia’s  most important “opium territories”,  that is,  in the so-called Golden
Triangle and Golden Crescent areas, the individual and collective strategies of the various
drug entrepreneurs have ended up being means of integration into regional and global
economic  and  political  games,  as  well  as  the  means  of  economic  and  political
circumvention of what have basically long been centrifugal state policies.  Peripheries
and, or, margins (in Afghanistan, unlike in Burma, opium poppy cultivation is far from
being only relegated to border areas or even to mountainous areas) and their actors have
eventually  turned  such  centrifugal  policies  into  centripetal  dynamics,  notably  by
transforming  from  peripheries  or  margins  into  centres  (it  is  in  the  most  remote
peripheries of Burma, Laos, and Thailand, far away from the region’s political centres and
capitals, that the centre(s) of the Golden Triangle emerged). Peripheries and margins can
and sometimes do become centres of their own (Chouvy, 2002).
14 In the end, while politico-territorial control deficit is a sine qua non for illegal drug crop
cultivation on large commercial scales, the reasons for such a deficit are as diverse as the
considered countries. They are non-exclusive and include armed conflicts, corruption,
political bargaining and other domestic or foreign realpolitik, lack of human, economic or
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material resources, territorial vastness, etc. Clearly, the fact that largescale illegal drug
crop cultivation takes place in a given country implies that either the state or parts of its
apparatus are actively involved in drug production, or that the state and its authorities
do not control  (enough to enforce the state’s laws),  for whatever reasons,  the entire
territory that is under their jurisdiction and nominal control. 
15 The first case scenario,  that of a state that would be actively engaged in illegal drug
production, is paradoxical since it has a name of its own (narco-state) that has become
extremely common despite a pervasive lack of definition and, even more so, despite the
fact that, as I have argued elsewhere, there are no such things as narco-states (Chouvy,
2016). The three most pertinent criteria by which to judge whether a given country would
qualify as a narco-state,  provided it  exists at all,  would be:  the absolute and relative
surface area covered by illegal drug crops; the size of the illegal drug economy relative to
the  overall  economy  and,  most  importantly,  the  state-sponsorship  of  illegal  drug
production and/or trafficking. 
16 Contrary to what most definition attempts have described, the ideal narco-state would be
the  opposite  of  a  state  whose  institutions  have  been penetrated  by  drug  trafficking
organizations or of a state whose officials have been corrupted by drug money. A state
cannot qualify as a narco-state unless illegal drug production and/or trafficking are/is
the result of top-down economics where the state developed, if not initiated, an illegal
drug industry.  For a state to be rightly categorized as a narco-state,  the illegal  drug
industry would have to be sponsored by the state and should contribute to the majority of
a country’s overall economy. 
17 According to such a definition, neither North Korea nor Afghanistan, arguably the world’s
two most drug-tainted economies, can be called narco-states. Indeed, in Afghanistan as
well as in all illegal drug-producing countries, North Korea apart, the drug industry is
developed through private extraction regimes or through joint extraction regimes that
involve both rulers and private actors (Snyder,  2006;  Goodhand, 2008).  Only in North
Korea, where the state is the closest to what a narco-state could supposedly consist of, has
the illegal drug industry been developed through a public extraction regime, the state
(and  not  only  some  state  actors  of  government  officials)  reportedly  coercing  some
farmers to produce opium rather than grain on parts of the state farms land they till
(Hurst, 2005; Lankov, 2011; Perl, 2003). 
18 That very specific case apart, most illegal drug-producing countries, and especially states
at war, such Afghanistan, Burma or Colombia, are weak or failing states where non-state
actors are too strong to be suppressed or ignored by the state. As Joel Migdal wrote,
“there can be no understanding of state capabilities in the Third World without first
comprehending the social structure of which states are only one part” (Migdal,  1988,
p. 34). He further explained how “in circumstances of fragmented social control, the state
has become an arena of accommodations”, something that is echoed by the limited access
order of Douglass C.  North’s natural  state (Migdal,  1988,  p. 264;  North et  al.,  2009).  It
therefore  appears  that  weak,  failed  or  natural  states  –  where  violence  is  limited  by
political manipulation of the economy and the subsequent creation of privileged interests
(North et al., 2009) – that cannot reign in their strongmen-turned-drug lords, and other
powerful  potentially  anti-government  non-state  actors,  cannot  reasonably  be  called
narco-states.
19 The second scenario, that of illegal drug crops permitted by a deficit of territorial control
(imposed or negotiated), is much more relevant than that of the so-called narco-state
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since such national cases exist and abound. There can be said to be three different and
non-exclusive types of politico-territorial control deficit. Firstly, there is the case of the
state that disposes of all the necessary means of territorial control and that regards the
fight  against  drugs  as  a  non-negotiable  principle,  but  that  nevertheless  finds  itself
incapable of fully and permanently controlling its own territory by effectively enforcing
its laws (such is the case of the United States). Secondly, there is the state that holds the
means of control required, in particular the coercive means, but that chooses to tolerate,
to some extent, illegal drug crop cultivation on its territory as a consequence of a binding
political  and socio-economic context:  here,  the partial  deficit,  more than the lack,  of
politico-territorial control is determined by local realpolitik, and drug law enforcement is
not a priority (such are the cases of Morocco and India). Thirdly, there is the state that is
challenged by a  significant  degree of  armed opposition and that  lacks  the means to
effectively extend its writ over its entire territory: here, effectively opposing illegal drug
crop cultivation is not materially possible (such are the cases of Afghanistan and Burma).
The latter two cases are in general also those in which a significant degree of corruption
by the authorities (that frequently participate in the protection racket of producers and
traffickers) can diminish the effectiveness of the state’s anti-drug policies and actions. 
20 The aforementioned deficits in politico-territorial control obviously raise the question of
the limits that exist between legality and illegality, between toleration and corruption,
and  between  legitimacy  and  illegitimacy.  The  three  politico-territorial  conditions
presented above in the second scenario as  distinct  types or  subtypes (inherent  state
limitations,  state  toleration,  and  state  powerlessness)  are  drawn  from  case  studies
presented  in  previous  work  and  that  cannot  be  reproduced  here  for  lack  of  space
(Chouvy, 2008; 2009; 2014a; 2014b; 2016; Chouvy and Afsahi, 2014)2. Their diversity shows
in particular that large-scale illegal drug crop cultivation can be undertaken regardless of
political  regimes  (democratic,  dictatorial,  monarchical)  or  of  legislative  or  coercive
apparatus (not even the most powerful). In the end, various types and levels of politico-
territorial  deficit  can  help  explain  various  types  and  scales  of  illegal  drug  crop
cultivation, depending on the politico-territorial contexts of course, but also, obviously,
on physical geography.
 
Types of politico-territorial control deficit and
cultivation patterns
21 The types and levels of politico-territorial  control deficit  can determine not only the
scope of drug crop cultivation but also its spatial forms and dimensions. Conversely, the
specific  spatial  forms  taken  by  cannabis,  coca  and  opium poppy  cultivation  end  up
reflecting the attitude of the considered states toward drug control and the means at
their disposal or invested in their anti-drug actions. The size of the fields, whether they
are rain-fed or irrigated, their isolation or grouping into large areas devoted to illegal
quasi monoculture, their concealment or not, their distance from roads, towns and even
regional  and national  capitals,  are  among the  many indications  of  a  state’s  attitude
toward  illegal  drug  crop  cultivation  (or,  of  course,  of  its  relation  to  the  population
involved in illegal cropping). 
22 According to the William G. Hoskins a landscape is “both a record, a rich body of evidence
about  the  past,  and a  problem to  be  investigated,  a  complex  set  of  questions  to  be
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addressed” (Baker, 2010, p. 115). While landscapes can bear clues of a more or less distant
past3,  they can also be read as an indication of  how state and non-state actors have
adapted and keep adapting to one another through mobility, change, and even conflict.
Such clues can be found in observing what John Brinckerhoff Jackson has termed the
political landscape (produced by the power) and the vernacular landscape (produced by
the inhabitants) (Brinckerhoff Jackson, 1984). In most illegal drug crop cultivation areas,
whether in the United States, in Morocco, in India, or in Afghanistan and in Burma, drug-
crop landscapes tend to display more vernacular features (“where evidences of political
organization of space are largely or entirely absent”) than political features (“spaces and
structures designed to impose or preserve a unity and order on the land, or in keeping
with  a  long  range,  large-scale  plan”)  (Brinckerhoff  Jackson,  1984,  p. 150).  In  these
countries, the peripheries and margins, or simply the remote areas, being geographically
distant  from the  political  centres  and  their  public  facilities  and  infrastructures,  are
conducive to illegal drug crop cultivation (mountains, deserts, national forests and parks,
border zones, etc.).
23 What landscape analysis can reveal about the politico-territorial control exerted by a
given state is made obvious, for example, by the contrast that exists between the spatial
forms  taken by  cannabis  cultivation  in  the  United  States  and in  Morocco,  two very
different  countries  obviously,  but  two  countries  where  illegal  commercial  outdoor
cannabis cultivation is important, where most growers operate on small-scale “family
farms”, and where most of the labour is done by family members, and also neighbours
and friends (especially in the United States during the harvest / trimming season when
“trimmigrants4” are also needed). Both countries also have their share of growers who
are  not  originally  peasant  farmers  but  have  come  back  to  their  land  (“back-to-the-
landers” in the USA) or country (“Marocains de l’extérieur” ou “Marocains résidents à
l’étranger” (MRE) in Morocco):  out-of-work construction workers  (Moroccans  coming
back from Spain), coal miners (Kentucky) or loggers and fishermen (California’s Emerald
Triangle) (Meisel, 2017)5. 
24 Beside these similarities, cultivation and production techniques differ very much in both
countries, not only because the United States produces marijuana and Morocco produces
hashish, but also because the cannabis landscapes are radically different. In Morocco,
cannabis cultivation is undertaken over entire valleys and slopes. It extends along wadi
beds and even runs along some of the Rif’s main roads, in full view (although some fields
happen to be somehow dissimulated behind rows of corn) despite its illegality and partly
because of the tacit agreement and/or corruption of the authorities. On the opposite, in
the United States, when cannabis is not cultivated indoor (including in greenhouses), it is
usually grown out of sight, carefully hidden on public land or in third-party agricultural
fields. Either way, cultivation is concealed and carried out on lands that usually do not
belong to the growers so that they can avoid having their land and property seized by the
authorities under the Asset Forfeiture Programme. Cannabis fields have increasingly been
cultivated in federal forests, where fields are often booby-trapped to protect the crops
from the authorities but also from harvest thieves. In the Midwest (America’s corn belt)
cannabis fields are often concealed, as is sometimes the case in Morocco, in the middle of
cornfields that belong to unsuspicious third-party famers (although in Morocco cannabis
and corn would belong to the same farmer). 
25 Despite  a  steady and significant  increase in its  human and financial  means since its
inception in 1973, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the US counter-narcotics law
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enforcement  federal  agency,  has  never  been  able  to  reduce  either  illegal  cannabis
cultivation or the number of methamphetamine laboratories, much less drug trafficking
in general.  Toleration is  as evident in Morocco as repression is  in the United States,
“where researchers have characterized these growers as committing crimes of resistance
and  accommodation  against  those  perpetrating  the  exploitation  of  their  labor  and
environment” (August, 2012, p. 21). The fact remains that cannabis cultivation exists in
both countries over vast and comparable areas (reportedly 47,500 ha in Morocco in 2012
and 44,000 ha in the US outdoors only, in 2009), despite its illegality and in part because
of the absence (Rif) or the collapse (California, Kentucky) of agriculture-based economies
and resource-intensive industries (logging, mining or fishing) (UNODC, 2013; HIDTA, 2010;
August, 2012, p. 22). 
26 In the radically different Afghan context opium poppies are cultivated over vast areas
(201,000 ha  in  2016,  according  to  the  UNODC),  often  covering  entire  valleys,  in  a
proximity to main roads that depends on the local presence and power of the state. The
fact that poppy cultivation (and also, increasingly, cannabis cultivation) is so widespread
(even if  it  concerns  only  about  two per  cent  of  Afghan arable  lands)  and that  it  is
overwhelmingly carried out in plain view attests to the weakness and even, of course, to
the corruption of some of the state agencies and agents, which sometimes simply cannot
establish the authority of the state in provinces or districts controlled to various degrees
by  anti-government  insurgents.  In  Afghanistan,  as  well  as  in  Burma,  the  armed
contestation that takes place in parts of the national territory makes large-scale illegal
opium production feasible, whether by non-state armed groups, by some of the poorest
rural populations, or by well-connected and powerful landlords who can play their part in
the corruption that  undermines  otherwise  limited antidrug policies  and actions.  The
valleys and plains of southern Afghanistan, some of which are covered with irrigated
poppy fields,  contrast of  course with the multitude of much smaller and much more
discrete swidden fields that dot the mountainous slopes of northeastern Burma (where
the valley bottoms can also occasionally be covered with poppies).  In both cases,  the
weakness and/or corruption of the authorities is readable in the landscape. 
27 The same is true of Arunachal Pradesh, India, where state toleration is high but where the
mountainous terrain dictates the spatial and altitudinal distribution of poppy fields, from
the large plots of land that can be found in the vast flood plains (often on large and poorly
accessible  silt-rich  river  islands  exposed  during  low-water  periods)  to  the  smaller
swidden fields found on even less accessible mountain slopes. Only topography, therefore,
blurs the maps of the spatial forms taken by illegal drug crop cultivation and of their
political-territorial significance (Chouvy, 2009; 2014). 
28 Obviously,  and  as  stressed  by  geographer  Joseph J. Hobbs,  “drug  landscapes  are  no
ordinary landscapes” (Hobbes, 2004, p. 301). They “either are or are meant to be hidden
landscapes, concealed in sometimes unique and creative ways”, as exemplified by the
“series  of  elaborate  environmental  interventions”  mentioned by  James H. Mills  about
cannabis cultivation in nineteenth century India: “In seeking to use these landscapes in
surreptitious ways they transformed them imaginatively, as they began to look at their
local environments in novel ways for the new purpose of avoiding the state’s planned
intervention” (Mills, 2004, p. 226). 
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Politico-territorial control, (il)legality, (il)licitness, and
(il)legitimacy
29 When lack or deficit of politico-territorial control is important enough to make large-
scale  illegal  drug  crop  cultivation  possible,  it  obviously  raises  questions  about  how
illegality can be decreed by a state and about how illegality can nevertheless be adopted
by non-state actors but also by certain state actors. In most cases, the illegality of drug
crop cultivation and even of  the  drug  trade  actually  raises  issues  of  legitimacy  and
compatibility: illegality of an economic activity often deemed legitimate by those who
undertake it, and subsequent incompatibility between legal categories. This is notably the
consequence of the slow construction of political-territorial control by modern states
that,  according  to  the  “Westphalian”  ideal  type  model  that  underlies  nation-states,
imposes, not without difficulties, a unitary national law not only over various preexisting,
and sometimes contradictory, customary laws, but also over a territory bound by modern
borders that replace traditional frontier zones. 
30 A border, through its definition and its delimitation processes, modifies the very nature
of any traditional trading that preceded its imposition. In fact, the activities suddenly
termed smuggling or trafficking are often nothing else than traditional trading turned
illegal  or  traditional  goods  turned  illegal.  As  Christopher  Tomlins  aptly  stresses:  “
Legalities  generate  illegalities,  for  the  two  are  necessary  conditions  of  each  other’s
existence. Law, after all, makes outlaws, not law’s absence. Their cheek-by-jowl intimacy,
in fact,  helps explain how easily,  and frequently,  legality and illegality trade places »
(Tomlins, 2001, p. 3). For example, “what is now called smuggling was normal among the
Pashtun nomads of eastern Afghanistan for many generations” (Canfield,  1986,  p. 97).
Between Afghanistan and Pakistan,  as well  as between Burma and Thailand,  imposed
boundaries cut through frontier zones and tribal land, changing frontiers into borders
and creating de facto jurisdictions F02D  in effect, bounded legal territories. But boundaries
also affect  the very nature or  existence of  trading routes,  as  “a  road through tribal
territory is much more than an avenue of mobility” and as borders and state’s legislation
eventually  imply  that  “the  laws  of  the  state  intersect  with  the  laws  of  the  tribe”
(Ispahani, 1989, p. 141). 
31 As  Lord Curzon,  Governor  General  and Viceroy  of  India  (1899-1905),  remarked,  “the
earliest frontiers [actually referring to borders] ‘erected a barrier or created a gap’, that
is,  restricted  movement  and  access”  (Ispahani,  1989,  p. 3).  What  was  true  in  the
borderlands of Southwest Asia, and for its borderlanders, can also be observed in the
frontier area that stretched between Burma and Siam in the 19th century. The frontier
was  then  said  to  be  “golden,  silver  paths,  free  for  traders”  and  “the  tribal  people
wandering in the mountain forests were subjects of no power” (Thongchai, 1994, p. 73).
Borders were then far from being boundaries: they were frontiers. Lord Curzon depicted
this “widely diffused type of ancient Frontier” that was that of “the intermediary or
Neutral Zone”: “This may be described as a Frontier of separation in place of contact, a
line whose distinguishing feature is that it possesses breadth as well as length”6.
32 Boundaries eventually cut through transfrontier routes and altered the Southeast Asian
frontiers  from  areas  linking  polities  into  areas  separating  polities  (Chouvy,  2002).
Colonialism and, later, the rise of “nation-states”, required having boundary lines clearly
demarcated: “The major principle behind the Asian frontier system was recognition of
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the desirability of avoiding direct contact between the administered territories of the
various colonial empires concerned” (Lamb, 1968, p. 62-63). In Asia, where the power over
individuals was traditionally separated from the power over land, since a subject was
bound first and foremost to his lord rather than to a state,  modern boundaries have
“violently and arbitrarily” divided “ethnic peoples into different nationals” (Thongchai,
1994,  p. 164).  Hence,  the  ‘external’,  or  alien,  may  not  really  be  external  “while  the
‘internal’  can be made alien or external” as various tribal or refugee people can still
experience in Thailand, where many have spent decades waiting for Thai citizenship and
thus have never “belonged” to any state or nation (Thongchai, 1994, p. 170).
33 Politico-territorial control and ways of exerting it  have been deeply affected, first by
colonialism, then by the emergence of nation-states and the imposition of their national
laws  and  their  “international”  borders.  Drug  production  and  trade  were  obviously
amongst the activities affected as the colonial powers happened to encourage and even
sometimes  coerce  farmers  into  drug crop cultivation especially  in  peripheral  and/or
marginal areas. This is clearly what happened in northeast India whose long geographic
and political isolation is a clear explanatory factor of its (now illegal) opium production
(Chouvy, 2014b). 
34 In the same way that the opium and cannabis trades have not been illegal everywhere
and  at  all  times,  cannabis  cultivation  (in  Morocco  or  in  India)  and  opium  poppy
cultivation (in Afghanistan or in India) have not always been prohibited, depending on
time and location and the evolutions of international law (the international prohibition
slowly developed starting in 1906) and national laws (all the aforementioned countries
issued various prohibition edicts). This actually further complicates things for states as
consumptions habits and traditions inherited from more or less distant pasts, and still in
existence to various degrees in local cultures, make drug law enforcement and broader
politico-territorial control all the more delicate and difficult. This is especially the case
when drug crop cultivation, but also drug trade and consumption, have been declared
illegal under state laws but remain perceived as legitimate by parts of the populations.
This was the case, for example, when the 1957 Afghan prohibition of opium was enforced
in Badakhshan province (and only there), where opium production was historical and had
long been legal. As James Bradford explains, the opium ban in Badakhshan was perceived
by the population as “an intrusive and coercive cultural policy” that “exacerbated deeply
rooted sentiments that government policy was overtly pro-Pashtun”, thereby “ultimately
fragmenting  and  already  fractures  state-society  relationship”  (Bradford,  2015,
p. 225-226).
35 Therefore, it  is  important  to  distinguish,  following  Itty  Abraham  and  Willem  van
Schendel, between what is legal and what is licit, that is, between what “states consider to
be legitimate (“legal”)” and what people “consider to be legitimate (“licit”)” (Abraham
and van Schendel,  2005,  p. 4).  The  advantage  of  this  distinction  is  that  it  allows  an
approach to legality and illegality that is not binary and, above all, not based solely on
state-centred conceptions. As the authors rightly stress, “the state’s claim to a monopoly
of  regulated  predation  and  redistribution  of  proceeds  (i.e.,  taxation  and  state
expenditure)  is  based  on  the  delegitimization  of  other  forms  of  predation  that  are
constructed as robbery, piracy, fraud, warlordism, or racketeering. But, historically, the
boundary of illicitness has shifted back and forth as bandits helped make states and states
made bandits” (Abraham and van Schendel, 2005, p. 7). This is what Kathryn Meyer and
Terry Parssinen remind us of when they write that it was in “the hothouse created by
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China’s disintegration and the League’s successes, that gangsters and politicians molded
the modern international narcotics trafficking industry”. As a consequence, they explain
that “the symbiotic relationship between trafficker and politician that has become the
dominant  feature  of  the  contemporary  drug trade  has  its  roots  in  Asia  in  the  early
twentieth century” (Meyer and Parssinen, 1998, p. 12).  In fact,  beyond such symbiotic
relationships it  appears  that  in  most  major  illegal  drug producing countries,  and as
Kathleen Frydl has stated, drug control sometimes becomes “a valued tool of statecraft”,
one that can, eventually, develop “into less of a specific mission and more of a modality, a
way to exercise state power” (Frydl, 2013, p. 25).
36 Whether traditional opium consumption in Iran, religious cannabis consumption in India,
or modern “recreational” cannabis consumption in the United States is concerned, the
people and communities involved in what is basically illegal drug production, trade and
consumption “defy the norms and rules of formal political authority” because they find
their illegal activities to be acceptable and legitimate (Abraham and van Schendel, 2005,
p. 4).  Therefore,  illegal  drug crop cultivation reveals  the contradictory relations  that
different and opposed actors have to legality and illegality. While drug crop cultivation is
prohibited under international law and most national laws, drug production for non-
pharmaceutical uses is widely perceived as legitimate, some will say licit, by producers
and consumers  alike.  Indeed,  Abraham and van Schendel  explain:  “Legal  restrictions
often come up against socially sanctioned practices, and while this may have the effect of
driving these practices into the sphere of criminality, it does not eliminate them nor does
it necessarily force them into hiding” (Abraham and van Schendel, 2005, p. 19). This helps
to  understand why the debates  on the legitimacy of  drugs  illegality  have multiplied
worldwide in the past decade and especially in the United States (where a few states have
legalized cannabis production and consumption), in Latin America (where the failure and
the costs of the prohibition and its associated war on drugs have been denounced by
several heads of states), or in Morocco (where the illegality of the cannabis industry has
been discussed in parliament). 
37 The inherent and necessary limitations of the politico-territorial control exerted by the
states, whatever their political regimes and the means at their disposal, are made obvious
by the dimensions and various spatial forms taken by illegal drug crop cultivation. It is
ultimately the territory that lies at the very centre of the illegal drug crop cultivation
issue, being the theater of the many rivalries, the often duplicitous games and the many
interrelations that take place between societies, states and their apparatuses. Complete
politico-territorial  control  is  of  course impossible and as a consequence neither drug
production and trafficking, nor drug consumption7 are achievable goals. Between total
repression,  state  toleration,  corruption,  and  even  the  abandonment  of  a  costly  and
ineffective war on drugs, the states and the societies involved in the drug industry draw
an ever-revised map of illegality. At the end of the day, and in spite of the battles that
have  been waged and sometimes  won here  and there,  the  impossibility  of  complete
politico-territorial control, even by the most powerful, calls for the recognition that the
war on drugs has long been lost (Chouvy, 2009).
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NOTES
1. Furthermore, in the “galactic” or “mandala” polities of Southeast Asia where frontier and
border areas were traditionally managed differently (Tambiah, 1976).
2. Texts available on www.geopium.org. 
3. “The English landscape itself, to those who know how to read it aright, is the richest historical
record we possess. There are discoveries to be made in it for which no written documents exist,
or have ever existed” (Hoskins, 1955, p. 14).
4. Migrants whose labour is needed for the labour-intensive trimming of cannabis leaves.
5. In the United States, businessman growers (including the so-called “hustler growers”) are a
minority  and  subsistence  farmers  a  majority:  “back-to-the-landers”,  “pragmatists”  and
“communal  growers”  in  California  for  example,  and  “low-lifes”  in  Kentucky.  The  resort  to
seasonal workers (Mexicans in California) only takes place on larger farms, mostly those of the
businessman growers (August, 2012, p. 15-20).
6. Text of the 1907 Romanes Lecture on the subject of Frontiers by Lord Curzon of Kedleston,
Viceroy of India (1898-1905) and British Foreign Secretary 1919-24): Website of The International
Boundaries Research Unit (http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/docs/curzon1.html).
7. As the biologist and pharmacognosist Jean-Marie Pelt pointed out: “drug sticks to Man like the
skin to his flesh” (Pelt, 1983, p. 14).
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ABSTRACTS
As revealed by the examples of Morocco, northeast India, Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, and the
United States of America, degrees of politico-territorial control or law-enforcement deficit by the
state can explain,  to some extent,  the existence of large expanses of illegal  drug cultivation.
Causes of politico-territorial  control deficit  are many and non-exclusive.  They include armed
conflicts, corruption, loosely integrated territories, and lack of financial, human and material
means  of  asserting  state  control.  Large-scale  illegal  drug  crop  cultivation  can  take  place
according to three main scenarios: that of a full-fledged but inefficient war on drugs; that of
toleration, for various motives, of illegal drug plant cultivation by the state (which can amount to
negotiated but effective control); and that of the militarily-challenged state that cannot exert full
control over its territory. The fact that total politico-territorial control by the state, no matter
how powerful and resourceful, is deemed impossible, shows that the war on drugs is doomed to
fail  despite  how  many  battles  were  won.  Eventually,  the  very  limits  of  the  state’s  politico-
territorial control, when applied to counter-narcotics and law enforcement, implicitly question
the illegality of a practice that is considered legitimate by many.
INDEX
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